Tenant Buy Outs -- Making Them Happen

The Terra CRG Brooklyn Real Estate Summit on May 9, 2013 at the Brooklyn Academy of Music was truly amazing. My guess would be that over 400 people attended, up from last year. One Hundred and Twenty people attended our workshop -- BUY OUTS! Making Them Happen!
 
Workshop Description: Whatever the reason, often enough an owner wants a tenant out…and the tenant will just not go! Maybe the tenant is protected by rent regulation, or maybe the tenant has a long lease left to live out. In this workshop, veteran real estate attorneys Jay B. Itkowitz and Michelle A. Maratto take a unique look at this problem and suggest some unique approaches and solutions. If you missed the workshop -- click here for a copy of the materials and/or email Michelle Maratto for more information.
 

Finder's Fees: Simple Strategies to Protect Your Returns

FINDER’S FEES
Simple Strategies to Protect Your Returns
 
 
 
April 2013 Publication and Email Blast To Select Itkowitz PLLC Clients -- Subscribe to Our Mailing List


1. What is a Finder’s Fee?
 
A “finder” is one employed to bring two or more parties together so that they can meet to do their own negotiating and make their own bargains.[1]  Finders act to “find” potential buyers or sellers, stimulate interest, and bring parties together.[2]  But they have neither the obligation nor the power to negotiate a transaction.[3]  Nevertheless, while they perform some related functions, it is critical to distinguish a broker from a finder.
 
2. Distinction between a Finder and a Broker.
 
While they perform some related functions, a broker should nevertheless be distinguished from a finder.  This distinction is based on the quality and quantity of the services performed.[4]  Thus, unlike a finder, a broker ordinarily must shepherd the parties into consummating the agreement, rather than simply introducing the bargaining parties to one another. 
 
Also, unlike a finder, in New York a broker carries a defined, fiduciary duty to act in the best and more involved interests of the principal.[5]  Thus, a court may find that a principal’s relationship with its “broker”, is really a relationship with a finder in instances where the individual has duties limited to only finding business for acquisition in exchange for a finder’s fee absent any contractual obligations of trust and confidence.[6]
 
3. How Finders Can Get In To Trouble If They Are Doing Unlicensed Real Estate Brokerage.
 
Here is where things get tricky.  As we saw above, a finder and a broker are, generally, different animals.  If, however, the acquisition of real property is the dominant feature of the contract at issue, then the court is highly likely to consider a fee in dispute as one for real estate brokerage, not for finding a deal.  And New York Courts are clear that only licensed real estate brokers can recover a real estate brokerage fee.
 
In one case[7], one of the parties to the transaction sought to avoid paying a finder’s fee to the alleged-finder on a purchase of property, arguing that the finder was not a real estate agent, and thus not entitled to receive the fee.  The court held that the plaintiff, who was not a duly licensed real estate broker, was statutorily prohibited from bringing a breach of contract action to recover a finder's fee of 15% of net profit realized from the defendants' purchase and sale of real property.[8]
 
In such case, it did not matter that the written agreement drafted by the parties to the transaction explicitly referred to the finder being compensated as a “finder”.  It did not matter that there was nothing in the agreement, explicit or implied, that the finder was an agent of the parties.  It did not matter that the finder had no explicit or implied power to bind the parties to the transaction.  Nor did it matter that the finder did not have the power to negotiate the transaction, nor to do anything except find and introduce parties.  All that mattered to the court was that the underlying transaction involved the sale of certain real property, and plaintiff was attempting to collect a fee for facilitating the purchase and sale of that property. 
 
Courts have further held that in order for a non-licensed real estate broker to demonstrate his entitlement to a finder’s fee in a transaction that includes a real estate component to the deal, that the acquisition of real property be merely incidental to the underlying transaction, or that the services rendered be for any purpose other than facilitating the acquisition of real property.[9]
 
In another case, the defendant sought to obtain mortgage financing for a proposed 30–unit condominium to be developed on certain real property that it owned.  The defendant subsequently discussed with the plaintiff, “a Finder”, the prospect of its assisting in the procurement of a mortgage loan. The defendant and the plaintiff entered into a Master Fee Agreement, which set forth the fees to be provided to the plaintiff were the plaintiff to secure a loan commitment for the defendant.  The defendant established that the negotiation of the loan was the dominant feature of the parties' agreements.  Although the plaintiff's principal was a licensed real estate broker, the plaintiff, an unlicensed limited liability corporation, was barred from receiving a commission or fee for services relating to the procurement of the loan.[10]
 
4. Finder’s Fee must be in Writing in New York.
 
In New York State, the New York Statute of Frauds[11] requires that an agreement to recover a finder’s fee must be in writing.[12]  As such, in order to recover on a breach of contract claim for a finder’s fee, you must demonstrate that the agreement was reduced to writing.
 
5. An Email May Constitute a Writing Sufficient to Support a Finder’s Fee.
 
Emails may constitute “signed writings” within the meaning of the aforementioned statute where a party’s name at the end of his e-mail “signified his intent to authenticate the contents.”[13] 
 
In one appellate case, for example, where the defendant did not sign a brokerage agreement proffered by the plaintiff setting forth the details of the plaintiff’s commission, the plaintiff still won the case because the Court held that the chain of emails between the parties constituted a subscription by the defendant to the brokerage agreement.  Specifically, the various revisions, notations and email comments relating to the substance of the brokerage agreement demonstrated that the plaintiff and that the defendant were in regular contact, and had discussed and agreed to the essential terms.  The Court found that if:
 
(i) the plaintiff incorporated those revisions and sent the final copy back to the defendant's agent, and
 
(ii) the defendant assented to these revisions and did not reject, protest or correct any of the provisions in the last version of the agreement, than the agreement complied with the statute of frauds and was enforceable.[14]
 
6. Lessons for Venture Capital Firms when Bringing Investors together on a Real Estate Deal.
 
(1) Always have a written agreement between yourself and the investor you are working with.
 
As lawyers, we are so often surprised to see that sophisticated parties do not have their finder’s agreement reduced to writing.  However, people get busy, and they often do not want to sidetrack the momentum of a deal with papering the details.  Unfortunately, ignoring the details and not reducing the agreement with the investors to a writing can cost you big-dearly in the end.
 
(2) Save emails.
 
Sometimes those trying to get out of paying a finder’s fee will say that the deal completed was not the deal that was originally found, and thus the finder is not entitled to a fee.  They will allege that the deal ultimately transacted was too remote in time from the finder’s introduction, or that the terms were so different as to create a different deal.[15]  Email is a great way to dispel these kind of attempts at diversion.  If the parties continued to talk about a deal, that would tend to prove that it was the same deal. 
 
(3) Get a real estate broker’s license. 
 
A real estate broker’s license is not the hardest thing in the world to procure or maintain, and if doing so can protect large fees, why not have your group licensed for real estate brokerage if that is what you are doing anyway?  Be careful – because having an individual broker on your staff will not suffice. 
 
(4) You might also consider becoming a partner with the cash investor. 
 
If you are part of the deal as an equity owner, then your interests might be better protected.  You move from an ancillary party to the deal to a primary party.
 
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[1] Southack v. Lane, 32 Misc. 141 (1st Dept. App. Term 1900).
 
[2] Train v. Ardshiel Associates, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), judgment aff’d, 805 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New York law).
 
[3] Northeast General Corp. v. Wellington Advertising, Inc., 82 N.Y.2d 158 (1993).
 
[4] Train, 635 F. Supp. at 274.
 
[5] Northeast General Corp., , 82 N.Y.2d at 158 (finder-seller agreement did not create a relationship of trust between the parties by operation of law so as to produce a fiduciary-like obligation on the finder, and thus the seller could not withhold a fee after the finder failed to reveal to the seller that the prospect which the finder had brought to the seller had a reputation for taking actions in business dealings that could be detrimental to the seller, even though the seller was in fact damaged by the prospect’s actions; the seller failed to bargain for and specify a fiduciary-like relationship in the agreement).
 
[6] J.O.P. Consulting Group, LLC v. McCawley Precision Machine Corp., 272 A.D.2d 82 (1st Dept. 2000); Trump v. Corcoran Group, Inc., 240 A.D.2d 159 (1st Dept. 1997).  See also, Stiefvater Real Estate, Inc. v. Himbaugh, 42 A.D.3d 525 (2d Dept. 2007) (affirming trial court’s finding that the fee was a finder’s fee, and not a broker’s fee, due to “the plaintiff’s limited role as a finder, rather than as an agent acting in a fiduciary capacity”).
 
[7] Futersak v. Perl, 84 A.D.3d 1309 (2d Dept. 2011); leave to appeal denied, 19 N.Y.3d 938 (2012).
 
[8] Specifically, the Court referred to Real Property Law § 440(1), which states that the term:
“’real estate broker’ means any person, firm, limited liability company or corporation, who, for another and for a fee, commission or other valuable consideration, lists for sale, sells, at auction or otherwise, exchanges, buys or rents, or offers or attempts to negotiate a sale, at auction or otherwise, exchange, purchase or rental of an estate or interest in real estate, or collects or offers or attempts to collect rent for the use of real estate, or negotiates or offers or attempts to negotiate, a loan secured or to be secured by a mortgage, other than a residential mortgage loan, as defined in section five hundred ninety of the banking law, or other incumbrance upon or transfer of real estate, or is engaged in the business of a tenant relocator, or who, notwithstanding any other provision of law, performs any of the above stated functions with respect to the resale of condominium property originally sold pursuant to the provisions of the general business law governing real estate syndication offerings. In the sale of lots pursuant to the provisions of article nine-A of this chapter, the term ’real estate broker’ shall also include any person, partnership, association or corporation employed by or on behalf of the owner or owners of lots or other parcels of real estate, at a stated salary, or upon a commission, or upon a salary and commission, or otherwise, to sell such real estate, or any parts thereof, in lots or other parcels, and who shall sell or exchange, or offer or attempt or agree to negotiate the sale or exchange, of any such lot or parcel of real estate. …. In connection with the sale of a business the term ’real estate broker’ shall not include a person, firm or corporation registered pursuant to the provisions of article twenty-three-A of the general business law or federal securities laws.
 
[9] Ling v. Bode, 94 A.D.3d 951 (2d Dept. 2012). 
 
[10] JCP Properties v. Equity Land, 102 A.D.3d 745 (AD2d, 2013).
 
[11] General Obligations Law § 5-701(a) (10) (i.e., the New York Statute of Frauds) states that:  [e]very agreement, promise or undertaking is void, unless it or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement, promise or undertaking:[i]s a contract to pay compensation for services rendered in negotiating a loan, or in negotiating the purchase, sale, exchange, renting or leasing of any real estate or interest therein, or of a business opportunity, business, its good will, inventory, fixtures or an interest therein, including a majority of the voting stock interest in a corporation and including the creating of a partnership interest.  “Negotiating” includes procuring an introduction to a party to the transaction or assisting in the negotiation or consummation of the transaction.  This provision shall apply to a contract implied in fact or in law to pay reasonable compensation but shall not apply to a contract to pay compensation to an auctioneer, an attorney at law, or a duly licensed real estate broker or real estate salesman.
 
[12] The statute of frauds applies to claims for fees by finders.  See, e.g., Freedman v. Chemical Const. Corp., 43 N.Y.2d 260 (1977); Intercontinental Planning, Limited v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372 (1969) (decided under predecessor statute to N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701); Hardy-Latham v. Wellons, 415 F.2d 674 (4th Cir. 1968) (applying New York law).
 
[13] Stevens v. Publicis, S.A., 50 A.D.3d 253, 254-55 (1st Dept. 2008).
 
[14] Newmark v. 2615 East 17 Street Realty LLC, 80 A.D.3d 476 (1st Dept. 2011).
 
[15] Simon v. Electrospace, 28 N.Y.2d 136 (1971).
 



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Broadened Definition of ‘Disability’ Signals Housing Providers to Embrace Interactive Process

April 2013 Publication and Email Blast To Select Itkowitz PLLC Clients -- Subscribe to Our Mailing List
 
On May 24, 2011 new regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the regulatory body charged with implementing the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), went into effect broadening the scope of what could qualify as a disabling condition under the ADA.  The EEOC drew its impetus from the ADA Amendments Act of 2008,[1] which Congress passed in response to the prevalent trend of courts dismissing a high percentage of ADA employment discrimination cases in favor of the employer on the basis that the plaintiff did not suffer from a “disability” as defined under the ADA.[2]  According to the interpretive guidance to the new regulations, their intended effect is to shift the focus of the employers and fact-finders from the question of whether the plaintiff in fact suffers from a “disability” to whether the covered entities met their obligations in reasonably accommodating the complainant after engaging in an “interactive process”.[3]

The passage of these new regulations also has implications for disability discrimination claims brought under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) [4] because courts and administrative judges routinely refer to ADA discrimination jurisprudence to inform decisions under the FHA.[5] Therefore, housing providers may also face heightened liability by virtue of the broadened definition of what constitutes a “disability”.   Thus, it behooves such parties to have in place a protocol designed to field requests for reasonable accommodation and to initiate an ongoing interactive process with the requesting party.
 
This article first discusses the definition of “handicap” under the FHA and considers how it may be impacted by the EEOC’s new regulation broadening the definition of “disability”.  Next it will highlight the importance of the “interactive process” under the FHA’s scheme notwithstanding that neither the actual statute nor the implementing regulations expressly mention it as is the case with EEOC’s regulations under the ADA.[6]  Finally, it will conclude that housing providers should implement procedures to handle requests for reasonable accommodation that are responsive, designed to produce a thorough paper-trail, and contemplate accommodating a wider array of impairments.
 
Definition of “Disability”, a Moving Target
 
Pursuant to the FHA, housing providers are prohibited from, inter alia, refusing residency to disabled persons, or placing conditions on their residency, because those persons may require reasonable accommodations.[7] Such discrimination includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” [8]
 
To show that a requested accommodation may be necessary, there must be an identifiable relationship, or nexus, between the requested accommodation and the individual's disability.[9]

Thus, a housing provider will naturally want to determine whether the person requesting the accommodation suffers from a “disability”, or in the terminology of the FHA, a “handicap”.  The statute and the corresponding regulation enacted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), define an individual with a handicap as a person who (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, (2) has a record of such an impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); 24 C.F.R. § 100.201. [10]

"Major life activities” include “… functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working.” [11]

In determining whether the plaintiff suffers from a “disability”, courts and HUD’s administrative law judges routinely invoke precedent under both the ADA[12] and the Rehabilitation Act,[13] because of the statutes’ near identical language in defining the term.[14]  Thus, given this jurisprudence and the statutory overlap, the extent to which the respective implementing regulations inconsistently delineate the contours of a “disability”, yields a degree of unpredictability for the unwary housing provider.

For example, under HUD’s regulations, “major life activities” include “… functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working.” [15]  However, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 expanded the list of major life activities to include, inter alia, “eating, sleeping, standing, lifting, bending, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating,”[16] and impairments that affect “major bodily functions” such as “functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”[17]  Given this expansion, the ADA apparently confers coverage on a much broader set of physical and mental conditions than what may be gleaned by reading HUD’s definition.[18]  Thus, where a plaintiff seeking relief under the FHA, alleged disability due to depression, the court looked to the ADA for guidance and found that it is not a “per se” disability, but rather a disability only when it “substantially limits” a “major life activity”.[19]
 
Up until May 24, 2011, the analysis of whether a condition “substantially limits” a “major life activity” entailed asking whether such disability “severely restricted” the performance of activities that are “of central importance” to most people’s daily lives.[20] As noted above, this formulation resulted in a high percentage of disability cases being dismissed in favor of the defendant and sparked the eventual passage of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.[21]  Enacted pursuant to this statutory mandate, the EEOC’s final rule, effective as of May 24, 2011, provides that an impairment is a disability if it substantially limits a major life activity[22] and, that to be “substantially limiting,” an impairment need not severely restrict performance of a major life activity.[23]

As written, the rule provides little, if any, guidance on what would meet the “substantially limiting” threshold other than to say that it could be something less than a “severe restriction” of a major life activity.  Because the rule is relatively new, there is sparse decisional history interpreting the new language.  In one case involving a plaintiff who claimed that a concussion prevented her from standing for prolonged periods of time without hourly breaks over a period of three weeks, the court ruled that the statute’s use of “substantially limiting,” at minimum, excluded coverage for such minor and temporary impairments, irrespective of the new rule’s more inclusive language.[24]  However, beyond this baseline, it is difficult to speculate exactly how much less restricting a handicap has to be to fall short of a “severe” restriction but still qualify as a disability that “substantially limits” a major life activity.  The boundaries will gradually be colored in as the rule and ADA Amendments Act are litigated.  Nevertheless, one thing is clear given the intent behind both changes, which is that a much broader set of conditions will qualify as a disability because of the expansion of contemplated “major life activities” and the lower threshold in evaluating a “substantially limiting” condition.  The inherent uncertainty of the current state of disability law coupled with the courts’ practice of referring to the ADA to evaluate a “disability”, strongly counsels in favor of housing providers adopting a well-organized and articulated interactive process of dealing with requests for reasonable accommodation.

The “Interactive Process” and the FHA

Neither FHA’s plain language nor HUD’s regulations mention the duty of a housing provider to engage in an interactive process.[25]  HUD’s interpretive guidelines are likewise silent on the issue.  However, in a 2004 Joint Statement by the Department of Justice and HUD addressing reasonable accommodations under the FHA, the agencies admonished housing providers to engage in an open discussion with disabled individuals to explore alternative accommodations where the requested one is unreasonable.[26] The statement further reads:

An interactive process in which the housing provider and the requester discuss the requester's disability-related need for the requested accommodation and possible alternative accommodations is helpful to all concerned because it often results in an effective accommodation for the requester that does not pose an undue financial and administrative burden for the provider. [27]

Thus, although not codified, the housing provider’s duty to engage in the interactive process is underscored by this Joint Statement and some courts have similarly interpreted the FHA as imposing such a duty given the Act’s intended purpose of eradicating discrimination in the housing markets and its similarities with the ADA. [28]

With the passage of the EEOC’s new rule that broadens the definition of “disability”, the incentive has never been greater for housing providers to implement procedures that facilitate an interactive process with the requesting party.  Because it remains unclear exactly how much a disability must restrict a major life activity to be considered “substantially limiting”, the onus is on the housing provider to take the initiative and develop a thorough record of its inquiry and attempts to come up with reasonable accommodations. Indeed, failing to engage in such a process or thwarting its progress can raise an inference of bad faith or discriminatory intent, or, lead to per se liability.[29]  Therefore, insofar as cases involving an individual with a questionable request for accommodation may lead a housing provider to deny the request without much ado, it is precisely those cases that warrant the utmost attention and good faith effort to find a reasonable accommodation through the interactive process.

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[1] Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (Jan. 4 2008).
[2] Lawrence D. Smith & Molly Hughes Cherry, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: Practical Implications for Employers in 2012 and Beyond, 79 Def. Couns. J. 32, 32 (2012) (employers prevailed in 93% of ADA employment discrimination cases between 1998 and 2007) citing Amy L. Allbright, 2007 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I--Survey Update, 32 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 335, 335 (2008).
[3] 79 Def. Couns. J. at 33-4 (2012).
[4] 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631.
[5] “Due to the similarities between the statutes [ADA and FHA], we interpret them in tandem.” Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dept., 352 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2003); see also H.U.D. on behalf of Joseph Archibald, Complainant v. Riverbay Corp. et. al, 11-F-052-FH-18, 2012 WL 1655364, at *11 (H.U.D. A.L.J. 2012) (referring to ADA discrimination cases to construe the term “disability”).
[6] “To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (o)(3) (2006).
[7] 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2).
[8] 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 729 (1995); see also Joint Statement of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Justice: Reasonable Accommodations Under the Fair Housing Act, May 17, 2004, found online at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/library/huddojstatement.pdf  (hereinafter “Joint Statement”).
[9] Lapid-Laurel, LLC. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment to Tp. Scotch Plains, 284 F.3d 442, 459 (3d Cir. 2002).
[10] But ‘handicap’ does not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21).
[11] 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(b).
[12] The ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity,” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.  It further defines a disability as follows:
The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual--
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 
42 U.S.C. § 12102.
[13] The Rehabilitation Act states that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance....” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).  The statute defines an individual with disability as follows:
…the term “individual with a disability” means any individual who--
(i) has a physical or mental impairment which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial impediment to employment; and
(ii) can benefit in terms of an employment outcome from vocational rehabilitation services provided pursuant to subchapter I, III, or VI of this chapter…
29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(A).  Subparagraph (B) then refers back to the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1202, to include that definition of disability for specific provisions of the Rehabilitation Act.  Id.
[14] Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 46 (2d Cir. 2002) (“To demonstrate a disability under each of these statutes, a plaintiff must show: (1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) a record of having such an impairment; or (3) that they are regarded as having such an impairment.”); Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at 573 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Due to the similarities between the statutes [ADA and FHA], we interpret them in tandem.”).
[15] 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(b).
[16] 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2009).
[17] 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (2009).
[18] The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 79 Def. Couns. J. at 34 (speculating that diseases and conditions such as “epilepsy, diabetes, cancer, hearing loss, depression, multiple sclerosis, mental retardation, Hepatitis B, muscular dystrophy, and dyslexia will now be disabilities automatically covered by the ADA.”).
[19] McCree v. Lexington Village Apartments, No. 08-14185, 2010 WL 931859, at *6 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
[20] Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (holding that critical inquiry for qualification as a disability is whether the impairment (a) prevents or severely restricts the performance of (b) activities “of central importance to most people's daily lives); Carruthers v. BSA Advertising, Inc., 357 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that hand sprain was not a disability that severely restricted a major life activity); McNamara v. Tourneau, 496 F.Supp.2d 366, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that temporary back and leg injury lasting approximately 8 weeks did not meet the “severely restricted standard).
[21] See supra at note 2.
[22] 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(ii).
[23] 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1).
[24] Clark v. Western Tidewater Regional Jail Authority, No. 2:11CV228, 2012 WL 253108 at *7 (E.D.Va. 2012).
[25] 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(3)(B) (2000); 24 C.F.R. § 100.204.
[26] Joint Statement, supra note 8 at p. 7.
[27] Id.
[28] See Jankowski Lee & Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 1996); Armant v. Chat-Ro Co., No. Civ.A.00-1402, 2000 WL 1092838, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2000); Riverbay Corp., 2012 WL 2069654 at *3 (“Respondents refuse to acknowledge that the lack of an interactive process at the decision making level led to a wrongful denial of Complainant's request”);  but see Gretchen M. Widmer, We Can Work It Out: Reasonable Accommodation and the Interactive Process Under the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 2007 U.Ill.Rev. 761, 769-773, n. 75-77 (2007) (noting the split among the circuits on whether the FHA imposes a duty on housing providers to engage in the interactive process) citing, inter alia, Lapid-Laurel v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 284 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2002) (court declined to impose interactive process duty on municipality due to distinctions between housing and employment sectors). 
[29] Riverbay Corp., 2012 WL 1655364 at *24 (imposing civil penalties for defendant’s blatant disregard for the interactive process);  We Can Work It Out, 2007 U.Ill. Rev. at 774-777. (noting that many courts have held that an employer’s refusal to engage in an interactive process can lead to independent liability under the ADA and speculating that courts could well adopt a similar per se rule under the FHA given the overlapping jurisprudence).

Be Equipped For Equipment Lease Automatic Renewals

November 9, 2012 Email Blast To Select Itkowitz PLLC Clients -- Subscribe to Our Mailing List

By Stewart Wolf

When negotiating and planning your equipment leasing needs, it is important to understand the ins and outs of automatic lease renewal provisions. All equipment leases have a fixed term (usually 36, 48 or 60 months) with payments due monthly or quarterly. However, many leases have a provision that allows the lease to "automatically renew" for an additional period (usually one year) with lease payments to be made monthly at the rate for the most recent month, unless the lessee notifies the lessor in writing of its intention to terminate the lease at the end of the lease term. While it sounds confusing and unmanageable, there are certain advantages which can be realized, and these terms may even afford the lessee additional flexibility.

Sometimes the automatic lease renewal provision can inure to the lessee’s benefit. If the leased equipment is still functioning properly, the equipment is still being used regularly in the course of the lessee’s business, and the cost of replacement equipment is similarly priced, a lessee may want to exercise the automatic renewal provision (by doing nothing, and merely allowing the lease term to expire). This will allow the lessee to continue using the equipment without: (i) any interruption to business operations, (ii) having to incur the expenditures in time and money to research new equipment and negotiate a new equipment lease, or (iii) having to expend efforts to return the old equipment, and install and acclimate to the new equipment[1]. However, often times the equipment is becoming obsolete by the natural end of the lease term, the old equipment is not functioning as expected, or the decreased cost/improved functionality of new equipment is desirable; in such cases it is critical that you make sure to terminate the lease and prevent the automatic renewal period from kicking in.

To better understand a real-world application of these considerations, let’s examine a single restaurateur who has executed separate five-year leases, one for a walk-in meat locker for his kitchen and the other for a photocopier machine for the office in the back of the restaurant. As the five-year lease term for the two leases starts winding down, the restaurateur must decide whether to let his equipment leases automatically renew, or return and release new equipment.[2] Given the facts that:

(1) removal and replacement of a walk-in meat locker would be disruptive to the continuing business operations of the restaurant;

(2) there is little variation in functionality of meat lockers from one year to the next such that a newer model would have desirable upgrades, and

(3) the restaurateur would incur great expense to uninstall and return the old meat locker and install the new meat locker,

-- the restaurateur may well elect to allow the automatic renewal to kick in, keep the old meat locker in place, and continue making lease payments to the finance company for the next twelve months.

Alternatively, photocopier machines are notorious for becoming obsolete within minutes of being purchased! As with all electronics, five years is a veritable lifetime, and the newest models are undoubtedly more efficient, versatile and functional for the money than the old machine. In this case, the restaurateur would elect to terminate the automatic renewal provision, return the equipment, and enter into a new lease for a new photocopier machine.

Terminating the automatic renewal provision is simple, so long as the lessee is meticulous and diligent with complying with the lease requirements. Most automatic renewal clauses provide that the lease will automatically renew unless the lessee: (i) gives the lessor written notice between 60 and 120 days prior to the expiration of the lease that the lessee will return the equipment, and (ii) returns the equipment at the expiration of the lease. Unlike real estate leases, equipment leases are often simpler and do not enumerate a specific method as to where/when/how notice must be given; however, it is recommended that the notice be in writing and sent to the lessor via a method that allows you to prove that the notice was sent (i.e. overnight carrier, certified mail return receipt requested, etc.).

It is very important that you comply with the lease provisions and send a written notice to decline the automatic lease renewal within the proper time frame. Courts will enforce these automatic renewal provisions, and can be very rigid about the timelines; if you don’t send the proper notice within the proper timeframe, you could be in the unenviable position of having the equipment repossessed and having to pay the lessor an entire year’s worth of renewal rents, interest, late fees and attorneys’ fees!

New York law does provide the lessee with a little bit of protection in the form of General Obligations Law § 5-901, which states that automatic lease renewal provisions are only enforceable if "the lessor, at least fifteen days and not more than thirty days previous to the time specified for the furnishing of such notice to him, shall give to the lessee written notice, served personally or by mail, calling the attention of the lessee to the existence of such provision in the lease." Because most, if not all, leasing companies are aware of this provision, you will usually get a computer-generated letter from them 90-150 days prior to the expiration of the initial lease term. The letter may be cryptic, and make only a vague reference to a renewal provision in a specific paragraph of the lease. Unfortunately, courts have deemed this notice sufficient to comply with the statute. Further, many leasing companies will just include pre-printed language on your final 3-4 monthly invoices, which language refers you to the automatic renewal clause of the lease. Courts have also upheld this form of notice, so be sure to always read your monthly invoices very carefully!

Contrary to popular opinion, automatic lease renewal provisions are not all bad. If understood, and manipulated correctly, they can provide you with additional flexibility and leverage in structuring your commercial equipment acquisition. Just be sure to be vigilant and comply with all of the requisite notice provisions, so you will be better equipped to deal with automatic renewals.

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[1] Keep in mind that automatic lease renewal usually does not automatically renew the service contract. The service agreement for the equipment (if any) is almost always provided externally to the lease by a third-party. As such, it is important that you contact your service provider and negotiate a new service contract which coincides with the term of the new lease to ensure that the equipment will be properly maintained during the course of the renewal term.
[2] For the purposes of this example, we will assume that: (i) the restaurant maintains a viable business going into the sixth year; (ii) the restaurant still requires a meat locker and photocopier machine, and (iii) the restaurateur still prefers to lease these items rather than purchase them.

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